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THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

VOL. 13

8

THE EDITORS

Two Reports from the Underground

1. SPAIN TODAY
2. TERROR IN ETHIOPIA

The Sheltered Life

ALEXANDER L. CROSBY

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

Before you read anything else, please look at the filler on page 374. It is part of an ad which appeared in the *New York Times* on November 10 signed by 183 members of the faculties of Boston University, Brandeis, Harvard, M.I.T., and Tufts who have constituted themselves as the "Civil Defense Letter Committee" (address: P.O. Box 21, Belmont, Massachusetts). We think the letter is excellent and would like to see it circulated as widely as possible. We suggest that you write the Committee for a copy, reproduce it locally either in print or by mimeograph, and undertake an intensive campaign to distribute it to all the residents of your community.

That's one thing you can do for peace. The Fellowship of Reconciliation which also ran an excellent ad in the *Times* of October 29, gives other suggestions: (1) Join a Peace Organization (the newly-organized Women For Peace is successfully dramatizing the issue in demonstrations in the large cities across the country); (2) Become a Neighborhood Peace Center; (3) Be a Gadfly; (4) Be a Newspaper Nuisance; (5) Stand Up and Be

(continued on inside back cover)

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

There is nothing unusual about the existence of disputes within and between Communist Parties. They always have existed and presumably always will—until the parties themselves follow the state in withering away. What is unusual, and a sign that the disputes are deeply rooted and concern fundamental issues, is that they should be brought into the open. The Communist movement was born and reared in struggle, and its members know as well the strength that comes from unity as the defeats that are threatened by division. When division is publicly admitted, it may therefore be taken as evidence that a crisis has long been building up and that no resolution is in sight.

So it is in the case of the dispute between the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties which flared up at the Twenty-second Congress of the Soviet Party held in Moscow during the last half of October. This is plainly a complicated affair, with roots which may well reach back to the very earliest years of Chinese Communism after World War I; and its analysis is certainly not made any easier by the fact that, so far at any rate, the public aspect of the dispute has revolved around so improbable an issue as the internal regime of Albania. (That public debate has been so narrowly limited is, incidentally, a clear sign that both sides are anxious to keep things under control and to leave the way open for a reconciliation that would involve a minimum of backing down.) Nevertheless, the problem is so important not only for the situation inside the socialist camp but also for international relations in general, that an attempt at understanding must be made. This is the more necessary since American newspapermen, with one or two exceptions, have long since lost the ability to distinguish between explaining something and making cold-war propaganda out of it, with the result that the more conscientiously one reads the press the more confused one is likely to become. In what follows we center attention on what we take to be the central issue in the whole dispute.

We feel reasonably sure that this issue is *not* whether or not a third world war is inevitable. Though the United States press repeats *ad nauseam* that the Chinese believe in the inevitability of such a war, we have never seen any statements by Chinese spokesmen which assert this or even will bear this interpretation. It should be specially emphasized that the inevitability of so-called "small" wars is not at issue here. The Chinese may believe them to be inevitable, but so may the Russians and the Americans: the point is that none of them—nor any other country for that matter—would behave essentially differently if it regarded small wars as no more than probable or even only possible. This is certainly not true of world war in the atomic age: if you really believe it to be inevitable your policy is bound to be profoundly affected. We know of no evidence that the policy of the Chinese government has been so affected: like both the Russians and the Americans, they continue to act as though they thought the big war might be avoided. And that is the best possible proof that they all do think it might be avoided.

The real difference between the Chinese and Russians, it seems to us, turns around an issue which is in a sense the very opposite of the inevitability of World War III, namely, *what course of action the socialist countries ought to follow in order to minimize the threat of World War III*. Judging from both what they say and what they do, we would describe the positions of the two countries in somewhat the following terms:

The Chinese Position. The world is divided into two camps, the socialist and the imperialist. These camps cannot be adequately described in terms of nations. It is true that some countries—like the Soviet Union and China on the one hand or the United States and the United Kingdom on the other—are for all practical purposes wholly in one camp or the other. But other countries are split between the two camps, with the reactionary classes belonging to the imperialist camp and the revolutionary classes belonging to the socialist camp. There may be a few countries that are genuinely outside both camps (Cambodia might be an example), but in general the notion of a vast third camp consisting of uncommitted or neutralist nations

is wrong and misleading. The struggle between the two camps is class struggle; it rages between countries and within countries; it will continue until classes themselves have disappeared, i.e. until the complete victory of socialism on a world scale. (This much *is* inevitable, but of course class struggle doesn't necessarily imply world war.)

Since in any struggle, strategy and tactics are largely determined by the character of the enemy, the socialist camp's assessment of present-day imperialism becomes a matter of decisive importance. It is in this connection that the Chinese hold what are perhaps their most distinctive doctrines. In their view, differences and divisions within the imperialist camp are of secondary importance. On the crucial issue of the fight against socialism, it is united behind the undisputed leadership of the United States. The United States in turn is a dictatorship of monopoly capital. Imperialism is thus a monolithic force controlled by a small handful of American super-monopolists. Because of their position in the imperialist camp, and because in the past imperialism exercised unchallenged domination over the whole world, the American overlords think they can have everything their way. This notion of their own omnipotence, however, is an illusion. Actually, the socialist camp is already in many ways as strong as if not stronger than the imperialist; and, since it includes, at least potentially, the popular masses everywhere, it *could* be much stronger. But the belief in the superiority of the imperialists is held not only on their own side but is also widely accepted in the socialist camp. Here too the past weighs heavily on the minds of the living: humble folk, accustomed through the centuries to exploitation and impotence, find it extraordinarily difficult to grasp the great truth that, properly organized and led, they can sweep all before them.

This assessment of the character of imperialism and of the relation of forces between the two camps leads logically to certain views about the appropriate strategy and tactics for the socialist camp to pursue. First, there should be no illusions about the possibilities of driving wedges into the imperialist camp and thus undermining its unity and sapping its strength. The principle that "those who are not for us are against us" should be consistently applied: no aid or comfort to anyone who either

belongs to or compromises with the imperialist camp. Conversely, the socialist camp should mobilize all its energies and resources to maximize its own strength. From this it follows that it is quite wrong for socialist countries to give economic or technical assistance to self-styled neutralist countries even if, as in the case of Yugoslavia, they travel under a socialist banner. All such assistance should go to the more needy in the socialist camp—to China itself, to Cuba, to the nationalist government in Algeria which is carrying on an armed struggle against the imperialists, and so on. This issue, it must be emphasized, becomes increasingly important as the wealth of the more advanced socialist countries rises and their capacity to furnish foreign aid expands.

If imperialism cannot be successfully fought by a divide-and-rule strategy, there is only one other way, that of unrelenting struggle. The doctrine was succinctly summarized in a speech in Peking celebrating the seventh anniversary of the beginning of the Algerian rebellion, by Liu Ning-yi, head of the Chinese trade unions:

The only effective way to deal with imperialism and the new and old colonialism headed by the United States is to wage a head-on struggle against them, tooth for tooth and eye for eye. We should never cherish the slightest illusion about them. (*New York Times*, November 2.)

What this means concretely depends, of course, on the particular conditions of time and place: guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam, military pressure plus long-range political warfare against the United States and Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa, and so on. But two things must never be lost sight of: imperialism is the enemy, and its total defeat the ultimate goal.

It is probably this doctrine more than anything else that is responsible for the view that the Chinese regard world war as inevitable. Not at all, they say. It is only through struggling against and defeating the imperialists, not once but again and again, that the true relation of forces in the world today can be driven home to them. The imperialists still think and act as though they were top dog, able to impose their will on the world. It is this assumption of superiority that contains the main

danger: the imperialists may unleash a world war in the mistaken belief that they can win it. The way to avoid war is therefore to convince them that this is not so, to prove to them that they would in fact be committing suicide. But ruling classes in decline do not learn from preachments, they learn only from bitter experience. Hence the need to struggle against them and defeat them. This is also necessary to educate the masses in the socialist camp, to enable them to overcome their centuries-old inferiority complex, to give them the necessary self-confidence to mobilize all their energies for the speediest possible victory of socialism on a world scale.

Against this background we can understand what may be regarded as the keystone of the Chinese theoretical arch, Mao Tse-tung's famous "paper tiger" theory. By calling the United States, leader of world imperialism, a paper tiger, Mao means to inculcate in the masses, not of course the notion that the United States is harmless, but rather the idea that it is not invincible, that it need not be feared, that it can be fought against and defeated. Once this lesson is learned, no less by the United States imperialists themselves than by the masses all over the world, the danger of world war will recede and the triumph of socialism will be hastened.

The Soviet Position. It should hardly be necessary to stress that the Soviet and Chinese positions are built on common Marxist foundations. Both see the world in terms of a struggle between a declining capitalist-imperialist system and a rising socialist system; both believe in the inevitability of socialism's triumph; both see socialism as ultimately evolving into full-fledged communism. But within this broad perspective there is plenty of room for differences, and in the present context it is the differences rather than the agreements that are significant.

As compared to the Chinese, the Soviet position puts more emphasis on nations as actors on the world stage and less emphasis on classes. A careful study of Soviet pronouncements and policies during the past ten years or so would show, we believe, that the conception of the world as divided into three camps is in no small measure a Soviet creation. (The self-proclaimed neutralist nations have fostered the same idea, of course. But, as noted above, the Chinese have tended to divide the

third camp between the other two; while the American concept of the "free world" can be considered an attempt to annex it to the imperialist camp.) This does not mean that Soviet theory denies the existence of classes and class struggle within the third-camp countries, only that it also recognizes the reality of national interests and considers that they can play an important role in the historically decisive struggle between capitalism and socialism. More concretely, peace and economic development are genuinely national interests of the underdeveloped countries, cutting across class lines and rejected only by the hopelessly corrupt beneficiaries of regimes that are obviously on the way out. Since these interests are also shared by the socialist countries, there is a genuine basis for friendship and cooperation between the two groups of countries. It follows that the fact that an underdeveloped country is not socialist does not mean that it must be an enemy of the socialist camp. Thus the third camp idea is based not on illusion or propaganda but on solid objective foundations.* And since it exists in reality and not as a mere figment of the imagination, the third camp plays a large, probably a growing, part in Soviet international calculations and policies: from the Soviet point of view it is desirable both that countries should shift from the imperialist camp to the third camp and that the third camp as a whole should throw its weight into the balance on the side of the socialist camp and against the imperialist camp. Hence Soviet aid to such countries as India and Egypt; hence also Moscow's grim determination to stick to the United Nations even when the socialist nations were in a hopeless minority and the UN was openly waging war against the USSR's North Korean and Chinese allies.

It is not only in connection with the underdeveloped countries and their relations to the imperialist and socialist camps that the Soviet position differs from the Chinese. Their estimates of the present phase of imperialism are also at variance. As we have seen, the Chinese tend to treat imperialism as a monolith under the control of American super-monopolists; the Russians,

* To avoid misunderstanding, it should perhaps be added that there is no implication that either the third camp as a whole or any country's membership in it is permanent. But at the present time, and probably for many years to come, it is real and important, not an illusion.

by contrast, are much closer to the orthodox Leninist theory of imperialism as a system of rival monopoly capitalist nations. In their view, absolute American hegemony in the imperialist camp was a passing phase. The recovery of West Germany and Japan, the emergence of the Common Market, the stagnation of the United States economy—all these and much more attest to the continued operation of the basic law of uneven development. Here the Russians doubtless find additional reasons for emphasizing the national as distinct from the class aspects of the current international situation. By skillful maneuvering and a judicious use of its own growing economic strength, the socialist camp can hope to play the imperialist powers off against each other and thus hasten their collective decline.

Related to this view of imperialism is the Soviet Union's obvious rejection of the paper tiger theory along with its chief corollary that the only effective way to fight imperialism is through "head-on struggle." Imperialism consists of not one paper tiger but several all too real tigers, and the more it is possible to avoid head-on struggle with them the better. The best way to fight imperialism, contrary to the paper tiger view, is to negotiate, compromise, settle specific disputes as they arise—above all, avoid war and gain the necessary time for clear and convincing demonstration of the overwhelming superiority of the socialist over the capitalist system. As this superiority is driven home to the peoples of the world, the third camp will prove to be a mere way station on the road from imperialism to socialism, and ultimately there will be mass desertions from the inner core of imperialism itself. In the meantime, a premature showdown could lead to disaster for all concerned.

It might be argued that the Soviet Union's present German policy contradicts this analysis. We think not. The Russians believe, rightly or wrongly, that a remilitarized West Germany without internationally recognized borders is sooner or later bound to drag the world into World War III. On this particular issue of West Germany's borders (which necessarily implies the issue of East Germany's borders as well), they feel that it is necessary to risk a showdown with United States nuclear power now rather than wait for a certain showdown with German nuclear power later on. What they want, however, is

not a head-on struggle with imperialism but negotiations looking to the general stabilization of the situation in Central Europe.

This description of the Chinese and Soviet positions, brief and oversimplified as it unavoidably is, should be enough to show that on a number of extremely important issues the gap between the views of the two powers is wide indeed. Moreover, these are not recondite ideological questions of the how-many-angels-can-dance-on-the-head-of-a-pin variety. They concern the analysis of the actual international situation with all its complexities and dangers. Above all, they lead to divergent and often sharply conflicting conceptions of the right policy for the socialist camp to follow. For the Chinese, the imperialist camp is one homogeneous reactionary mass. To compromise with it is futile or worse; to assist any of its members is to give aid and comfort to the enemy; to retreat before it is to whet its aggressive appetites. The other side of the coin is that since imperialism is much weaker than it thinks it is or than it seems to be, it can be defeated by an unremitting policy of militant struggle. This is the way to avoid war, not to provoke it. For the Russians, on the other hand, the nonsocialist world is full of divisions and contradictions which can be intensified and exploited. Aid to nonsocialist countries may be eminently justified, compromises are essential, tactical retreats often wise. The way to defeat imperialism is to avoid head-on struggle while demonstrating in practice the superiority of socialism. Any other course would needlessly jeopardize the great achievements of socialist construction during the past forty years.

So much for the description of the two positions. When it comes to their evaluation, we have no doubt whatever that the Russians are right and the Chinese wrong. The Chinese position seems to us to be a typical example of a kind of dogmatic leftism that has appeared again and again in the history of the international socialist movement. Two of the distinguishing hallmarks by which it can be recognized are underestimation of nationalism and the lumping together of all opposition in an undifferentiated reactionary mass. It always exudes super-militancy and preaches no compromise. To the extent that it is translated into policy, the results are for the most part the opposite of what

is intended.* And finally, after blooming for a season it withers and dies, giving way to theories and policies based on a more realistic appraisal of the forces and relations that have to be coped with.

This should not, of course, be taken to imply that these recurring bouts of dogmatic leftism from which the international socialist movement suffers are simply the result of errors. On the contrary, in every case there is an objective basis for the theories involved: this explains why they are thought up in the first place, why they are widely accepted, and why they cannot be refuted by mere counter-arguments. In general, it is only a change in the objective situation itself that undermines a dogmatic leftist position and leads to its abandonment. And this we believe will turn out to be true in the case of China, as it has in other cases in the past.

China's dogmatic leftism today would seem to be rooted in both the domestic and international situations which confront the country. Domestically, China is in what may be called a "heroic" period of revolutionary construction, the inevitable tensions of which have been greatly aggravated by what appears to have been an almost unprecedented series of natural disasters affecting the country's crucially important agricultural economy. Such circumstances, by fostering a mood of revolutionary intransigence and militancy, always predispose to dogmatic leftism. China's unique international situation has not only worked in the same direction but also has imposed on the Chinese a special view of the world of the mid-twentieth century. The new

* A good example from the recent past is China's "tough" policy toward India in connection with the border dispute between the two countries. The Chinese may well be right that Indian militarists and right-wingers deliberately used this dispute in an effort to stir up trouble between the two countries. The dogmatic leftist prescription for dealing with such a situation is to hit back, "tooth for tooth and eye for eye." This is supposed to teach the reactionaries a lesson, weaken their position, and make them behave with more circumspection in the future. The effects in this case were rather different. The Indian militarists got the trouble they were looking for, Indian nationalism was aroused against China, the Indian Left was split and weakened, and India's drift to the Right was given added impetus. All of which the Chinese adduce as evidence of the nefarious character and devious ways of imperialism!

China's experience with imperialism has been almost exclusively in the form of a malignantly hostile United States which has never made any secret of its will to crush the Chinese Revolution. The United States has not only blocked China's membership in the United Nations, the badge of acceptance in the world of nations, but also successfully continues to parade the miserable satellite regime of Chiang Kai-shek before the world as a full-fledged nation. Given these facts—and they are facts that no one can deny—it seems not only natural but inevitable that the Chinese should hold their present views on imperialism and nationalism. In their experience, imperialism *has* been a monolith under United States control; and the nations of the world, for all their theoretical independence, have been unable or unwilling to bestow an equal status on the most populous country among them. Is it any wonder that China is unimpressed with the force of nationalism as compared with that of class interest? Furthermore, the Chinese view that the only way to fight against imperialism is through head-on struggle also seems to have been amply confirmed by their own experience. MacArthur, marching under the banner of the UN and with the backing of a Democratic President, ignored Chinese warnings not to invade North Korea. It was only full-scale Chinese intervention that pushed his forces back. And this intervention produced peace on the basis of the territorial status quo ante, not a world war: in this particular case, getting tough paid off.

But there is no need to prolong the recital of China's experiences during the past decade, nor to insist on their uniqueness; suffice it to say that in the light of these experiences there should be no difficulty in understanding why China is now suffering from a severe case of dogmatic leftism. The disease will abate and eventually disappear, one would suppose, when China is admitted to its rightful place among the nations of the world, especially if this takes place against determined United States opposition; and when the internal situation in the country eases as the great efforts of socialist construction begin to yield their fruits. In the meantime, the world should be grateful that China's foreign policy is subject to the moderating influence of the Soviet Union and the large majority in the socialist camp which agrees with the Soviet position.

TO AID OR NOT TO AID

In August of this year, general elections were held in British Guiana (BG) under a new constitution granting internal autonomy and promising full independence in the near future. The People's Progressive Party won a clear majority, and its leader, Dr. Cheddi Jagan, was duly installed as Prime Minister. In these days, when almost every month brings news of some new colony's winning its independence, these events might seem to warrant little more than a passing comment. And yet the conviction is widespread, both here and abroad, that in fact they were historic events, pregnant with meaning for the future of the Americas. No one can doubt that they are in fact worthy of the most careful attention.

The reason is certainly not that BG as such occupies a particularly important position in the Americas. It is, to be sure, a good-sized country, nearly twice the area of Cuba; but its population of around 600,000 is no more than a tenth of Cuba's, and its location on the northeast coast of South America is in no sense strategic. What lends such great significance to recent developments in BG is rather a combination of the following factors:

(1) The people of BG are mostly very poor, but there can be no doubt that their country has the necessary human and natural resources to sustain a process of economic development. In these respects, BG is typical of a large part of the world today, and particularly of neighboring Latin America. It may therefore be taken for granted that BG's performance, if at all outstanding, would have an importance out of all proportion to the size or populousness of the country.

(2) The People's Progressive Party is a left-wing socialist party which came to power on a platform promising to give first priority to the development of the country by socialist methods (comprehensive planning and the extension of the public sector as rapidly as circumstances permit). It follows that the efficacy of these methods in solving the problems of economic development may well be put to a crucial test.

(3) There can be no question about the Western-style

democratic processes by which the Jagan government came to power. Nor can there be any doubt about the genuineness of the PPP's popular mandate: this is the third general election which it has won over a period of nearly a decade, and all efforts of the British Colonial Office to undermine its strength (through deposing the first PPP administration and throwing Jagan into jail, gerrymandering electoral districts, etc.) were in vain. The long and hotly debated question as to the compatibility of Western-style democracy and socialism may therefore also be put to a crucial test.

(4) Paradoxical though it may sound, the fact that BG is just emerging from colonial status is definitely favorable to the success of the Jagan regime. There is no powerful group of politicians with a strong vested interest in the status quo. But even more important: contrary to the normal situation in Latin America, there is no entrenched military machine forming part of and lending indispensable protection to an existing ruling oligarchy. The political cadres, and the military machine which will come into existence with independence, will owe their allegiance from the outset to the new order.

What all of this adds up to is that little British Guiana, hitherto known to most people as a mere name in a list of British dependencies, is about to become the scene of an experiment in democratic socialism with potentially world-shaking consequences. And what makes the experiment so intensely interesting to any one with a sense of history is the patent fact that the chances of success are good.

We are *not* suggesting that a country as poor and underdeveloped as British Guiana can hope to perform miracles. Left to itself, BG would make very slow progress at best, no matter what the regime in power. Foreign aid on a large scale relative to the immediately disposable resources of the country is unquestionably needed. What we *are* suggesting is, first, that under a socialist regime BG will be able to make effective use of foreign aid for the purpose of rapid development; and second, that BG is in the enviable position of being very likely to get the foreign aid it needs. The first of these two points—that in underdeveloped countries a socialist regime can make most

effective use of foreign aid—has been repeatedly stressed in these pages and need not be dwelt upon in the present context. But the second calls for further comment.

Why do we say that BG is very likely to get the foreign aid it needs? One would certainly not expect the United States, which is usually thought of as the fountainhead of foreign aid, especially for countries in the Western Hemisphere, to be anxious to promote the success of a socialist experiment—heaven forbid! But, as Cuba has now proved, even Western Hemisphere countries can get aid elsewhere, provided only that they are willing to ask for and accept it. Cheddi Jagan, as one would naturally expect from a socialist, is perfecting willing to seek aid from the socialist countries, and judging from the record to date there is every reason to believe that they in turn would respond affirmatively to such a request. But BG is not even limited to the United States and the Soviet Union as possible sources of aid: it can reasonably hope for help from Britain as well. As an ex-colony and continuing member of the Commonwealth, BG has an inside track to London; while Britain, for its part, has economic interests in BG which it naturally wants to protect. But there is another reason, perhaps even more important, why Britain might want to aid BG: economic and social conditions in most of the British West Indies are appallingly bad and getting worse. Existing political movements are hopelessly inadequate to the tasks they face. Emigration to the United Kingdom has already created a race problem where none existed before and is becoming an increasingly hot potato for the British political parties to handle. The outlook is for more of the same: some competent observers even foresee in the not-distant future a reign of anarchy and senseless bloodshed in some of the more densely populated islands. An orderly, progressive, British-oriented regime in BG might introduce a new and hopeful element into this dark picture. Certainly there is no other leader in the British Caribbean with anything like the stature of Cheddi Jagan, and it might be of great advantage to London to have him on its side in the stormy period that lies ahead.

But whether or not London interprets British interests in this light, there is no reason to believe that the new BG govern-

ment will fail to get the aid it so urgently seeks—if not from Washington or London or Ottawa then from Moscow or Prague. And this fact is making Washington ponder deeply the question whether it might not after all be better to swallow its anti-socialist prejudices and provide Cheddi Jagan with what he needs. The alternative would seem to be another Cuba, carrying out the basic reforms that all progressives in Latin America recognize as essential, and doing so with Russian assistance and in the face of evident United States disapproval. Worse still, this would be a “Cuba” whose socialist government came to power through free elections and which, given reasonable success for its development program, could look forward to remaining in power through more free elections in the future. What more devastating exposure could there be of the elaborately maintained pretense that the only ground for United States determination to destroy Fidel Castro is his failure to hold those supposedly sacrosanct free elections?

No doubt about it, the United States is now on the spot. To aid would be to violate all the sacred principles of private enterprise and to encourage much larger countries containing billions of dollars of United States investments to follow in little BG's footsteps. Not to aid would be to hand the socialist bloc a tremendous victory on a silver platter, to expose the hollowness of United States policy declarations, to impart a further powerful anti-North American impulse to the developing Latin American Revolution. Of these two evils, which will Washington find the lesser?

At the time of writing, the answer is uncertain. Cheddi Jagan came to the United States in October in an attempt to find out for himself and went away still in doubt. Among his associates, there were varying guesses. Some felt that the tenor of their talks in Washington pointed toward a favorable decision, others were sure that in a showdown the tabu against helping a socialist regime would prevail. Washington, for its part, was obviously playing for time: a mission would be sent to BG to examine the country's needs and the regime's plans; final decisions would await its findings. As he was preparing to leave the country, the Prime Minister made it clear that he could not wait indefinitely. The problems of the people of BG, like those

of the hungry peoples all over the world, are urgent, and he had promised to do something about them without delay.

After his return to BG, Dr. Jagan reported on his trip to the Legislative Assembly. According to the *New York Times* (November 4), he told the legislators "that the United States had refused his requests for financial aid and had told him, in effect, to get it where he could." The next day the Times carried a Washington dispatch under the headline: U.S. IS SURPRISED BY JAGAN SPEECH. No final decisions had been reached, the dispatch said, and added: "Some officials suspected that this was an attempt to learn whether the Communist world had any interest in assisting British Guiana." Non-officials might be pardoned for suspecting that it was more likely an attempt to prod Washington into making up its mind.

Some issues can be "solved" by postponement, but the question of whether to aid British Guiana does not seem to be one of them. Dr. Jagan is scheduled to go to London in December, and it may be assumed that more than the date of independence will be discussed. From London planes leave for Moscow every day. For Washington, the fateful hour of decision is clearly approaching.

(November 10, 1961)

The United States seems destined by Providence to plague America with miseries in the name of liberty.

—Simón Bolívar

Dr. Johnson was talking to the King. The King then asked him if there were any other literary journals published in this kingdom, except the *Monthly* and *Critical Reviews*; and on being answered there were no other, his Majesty asked which of them was the best. Johnson answered that the *Monthly Review* was done with most care, the *Critical* upon the best principles, adding that the authors of *Monthly Review* were enemies of the Church. This, the King said, he was sorry to hear.

—Boswell, *The Life of Johnson*, 1767

History repeats itself.

TERROR, DESPAIR, AND SILENCE IN ETHIOPIA

The following manifesto from the underground National Front movement in Ethiopia was smuggled out of the country at great personal risk to the authors. We are proud to publish it in MR and hope that in this form it will reach a wide international audience. Readers will note the remarkable similarity of the conditions described to those in Latin America and other underdeveloped countries enjoying membership in the "free world." Similar conditions give rise to similar ideas, and similar ideas to similar actions. We wish Ethiopian friends all success in the nearest future.
—The Editors

After centuries of independence and twenty years of a so-called modern government the overwhelming majority of Ethiopians still live under medieval conditions of poverty, disease, ignorance, and recurring famine.

Especially over the past twenty years Ethiopia has experienced a new kind of political tyranny and police oppression not hitherto known in our history. In order to pay for the new luxuries of life, the ruling class has introduced for itself a system of corruption and financial gangsterism which is sustained and perpetuated by the police rule of the feudal *ancien regime*.

This development has come about mainly through the concentration of power in the hands of one man. Such a concentration of power was achieved during the past 20 years because:

(1) All the liberal leaders and the leaders of important communities were either ruthlessly rooted out or forcibly silenced. For instance some of the outstanding leaders of the patriotic movement during the period of enemy occupation have been either hanged in market places or are still languishing without trial in prisons just because they requested the introduction of modest reforms. It is now known that at least 20,000 people are imprisoned without trial.

(2) All members of the cabinet and officials in high places are personally appointed by the sovereign from among the most devoted and trusted personal servants.

(3) The feudal regime has established a secret police which

has terrorized the population and made frequent use of modern weapons to suppress any form of organized political movement in the country. On several occasions our airforce boys have been coerced against their will to bomb their own people.

Political Tyranny

It was true that the government of traditional Ethiopia was feudal and oppressive. In recent years a new type of political tyranny and police rule has emerged. The central feature of this tyranny is that all power is concentrated in the hands of one man. The ruler is supreme in all matters. He alone makes laws. He alone makes decisions great or small. He is the supreme judge of the realm. Most of the political, economic, and social evils under which our people suffer today are consequences of this single fact.

The cabinet is almost entirely a group of devoted personal servants who in fact are no more than overgrown clerks. Ministers who are personally appointed by the ruler represent no one, are responsible to no one but the ruler and the ruler alone. The so-called cabinet is in reality not a cabinet at all. The so-called government is in fact a Byzantine Court where the art of flattery has become a supreme virtue.

A minister cannot afford to have a personality and a policy of his own. In order to maintain their positions, and obtain favors, ministers and other officials of the regime (together with people seeking employment and favor), instead of working in their offices, idly waste their time standing about in the palace gardens, in positions specified by petty palace officials depending on the latter's interpretation of the expression on the sovereign's face when last directed to the individuals in question.

The Cult of Personality

An integral part of this theatrical farce is the cult of personality. Ethiopia suffers like Russia of Stalin's day from the cult of personality. The myth is officially propagated and enforced that not only does the sovereign rule by divine right but also that he alone is the fountain of all knowledge, wisdom, and progress—a sage in the kindergarten. This has been the theme of our newspapers and broadcasting for the last 20 years.

Personal Loyalty to the Sovereign

All appointments throughout the country are made by the ruler. The feudal regime enforces the idea of personal loyalty to the ruler which has become a *sine qua non* of citizenship. The central principle governing all appointments is personal allegiance to the sovereign. The idea of loyalty to the nation is subordinate. Whenever there is a conflict between the interests of the ruler and the national interest, the doctrine of personal loyalty means the former should take precedence. This is the reason why it has not been possible and is not possible to establish an impartial, independent, and competent civil service. When officials are appointed they must all pledge an oath of personal obedience to the sovereign.

Civil Rights

The Ethiopian people who fought valiantly for their freedom against foreign oppression are without freedom except on paper. Newspapers are state controlled and their daily theme is the glorification of their ruler. There is a rigid censorship of all publications. Writers dare not omit the photograph of their ruler on the front page of their works, and this has become one of the ways of spreading the cult of personality. The complete denial of expression, in whatever form, has had and will continue to have severe consequences for the social and cultural life of the Ethiopian people. The development of the arts has come to a complete standstill.

There is no right of association. It has not been possible to form political parties or trade unions, and even professional societies have encountered great difficulties. For this reason members of the so-called parliament are not elected on grounds of social and political principles with a view to improving the conditions of the people. Should they raise issues of principle in the debating chamber they are called to the palace for "guidance." Consequently the public is left in total darkness.

There is no freedom of speech either inside or outside parliament. There is no freedom of movement and travel. Ethiopians find it almost impossible to obtain passports, and even those who travel on government business must hand over their passports on their return.

Administration

The administration of the feudal regime is a mere extension and repetition of the Byzantine Court.

Appointments that are made by the present regime are made without regard to merit, education, or experience, the sole criterion being personal loyalty. In many cases, the higher-level officials are transferred from post to post so frequently they often have no time to learn their jobs properly. This perpetual merry-go-round is of significant political importance for the regime. It enables no one man to accumulate political power so as to maintain a position of strength and thereby renders each and every member of the entire political machine insecure and subservient to a central all-powerful dominating figure.

Our provincial administration is a disgrace to the twentieth century. The provincial administrator is a *locust* feeding on the peasantry. These administrators, like the locusts who come from afar, have no sympathy for the people or their problems. Any form of local initiative is discouraged. And all provincial appointments are made from the capital.

Justice

The judiciary again is an extension of the Byzantine Court. There is no impartial, independent judiciary. All judges are appointed by the ruler. In all important cases judgment is not given without reference to the ruler and prior consultation with members of the regime. Corruption is open and rampant at all levels. It is usual for cases to last several decades, thus ruining both parties.

Education

Since the war, a measure of progress was achieved in the field of education. This was motivated by the need to man the public services. Nonetheless only 3 percent of the estimated school age population attend school.

What is perhaps more alarming in the development of education in Ethiopia is the fact that education is controlled with the idea of producing conformists. The so-called University College of Addis Ababa is a Jesuit high school.

No liberal institutions have been founded, and little effort

has been made to encourage local initiative in education. At the present rate of progress it would take many centuries for full literacy to be achieved.

Foreign Policy

The bankruptcy of much of Ethiopia's foreign policy is rooted in the evils already outlined. As everyone knows, though Ethiopia was a founding member of the United Nations, her role in the African liberation movement developed only after the movement had achieved international recognition. Despite the events of change, our foreign policy is still hesitant, negative, and opportunist. The Ethiopian delegate arrives at international conferences only in his coat and trousers with empty brief case. He can only utter sterile remarks, thus presenting a pathetic figure by which Ethiopia is judged. This pathetic figure is the only image of Ethiopia seen abroad, but soon the world will see the true face of Ethiopia.

Feudalism and Economic Progress

When we refer to the government of Ethiopia as feudal we mean that it is a regime which fundamentally represents the vested interests of a privileged minority who own and control the land, property, and wealth of the greater part of Ethiopia, and that the overwhelming majority of Ethiopians work on the land as serfs to support and maintain in luxury and corruption the privileged minority.

The conditions of our peasantry are enforced by the state as the law of the land. This is so because the present regime itself is essentially nothing more than a government of landlords by landlords. The truth of the matter is that wealth and political power reside in the same group of people. Should anyone doubt this, the facts are there for everyone to see. That is why the present regime maintains and perpetuates feudalism.

In contrast to the oppressive conditions of our peasantry, the feudal absentee landlords who live in the towns are today busy building luxurious villas, buying expensive cars, not to mention the fact that each and every one keeps a string of mistresses. (Following the recent abortive coup, which caused the death of some fifteen ministers, countless illegitimate children

were declared at their funeral, a public scandal which has shocked the population of Addis Ababa.)

As regards the conditions of our peasantry, some of the ways in which the feudal regime and the landlord class exploit the tenants may be cited as follows:

(1) The tenant works with his labor and capital on the land all the year round and hands over a substantial amount of the produce to his landlord as determined by the latter. (According to the Ethiopian Civil Code of 1960, relating to land tenure, *Title XVIII, Article 2991, para. 1*, states that "the share of the products due to the lessor may in no case exceed three-fourths.")

(2) The tenant renders free services to his landlord, to the tax collector, to the district governor all the year round.

(3) The tenant pays bribes as a matter of course to the tax collector, district administrator, and district judge, as well as to the local policeman.

(4) Most peasants, unable to meet this burden, very often fall into the hands of money lenders and thereby incur additional indebtedness.

(5) The feudal regime has made no effort to ensure the security of the tenant.

Insecurity of tenure, sheer robbery by the landlord, indebtedness, bribes, and prison are the lot of our peasantry. Again in contrast to the conditions of our peasantry, the landlord class pays no taxes at all. There is no tax on incomes derived from land, no capital gains tax (not even in Addis Ababa where land values are increasing at a fantastic rate), and no inheritance tax. Furthermore, even rates of land tax are not progressive. In a sense all this is of theoretical interest since to the big absentee landlords taxes are no problem. Not only is there evasion but also a refusal on the part of landlords even to meet their bills for services rendered by public utilities.

Under these conditions, economic and social progress is impossible. Some years ago the feudal regime initiated a five-year plan. At the end of the planned period literally nothing had been achieved save the possession of documents which are

not circulated to the public even today. Many people say that the present regime has no interest in economic and social development whatsoever.

The truth of the matter is that even with the best of intentions economic and social development is of necessity impossible under the prevailing feudal agrarian structure. Institutional changes, including a radical change in the present system of landholding and the self-appointed feudal autocracy, are fundamental prerequisites of economic and social development in Ethiopia.

Nothing less than this will release the energies of our people from the present dormant and passive attitude to a more dynamic and constructive attitude which should form the only sound basis for economic and social development of our country.

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. We pay for a single fighter plane with a half-billion bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people. . . . Is there no other way the world can live?

—Dwight D. Eisenhower

A total of some 7.5 million Americans depend for their jobs directly upon the Military—almost precisely one-tenth of the nation's entire labor force. In some areas of especially heavy war-plant employment, the percentage is far higher and the dependence upon military spending is almost total. California, for example, reaps the benefit of nearly \$5 billion annually in military contracts. In Los Angeles, it has been estimated that fully half the jobs are dependent, either directly or indirectly, on the continuance of the arms race—and arms spending. Under such circumstances, every food store, every gas station feels it has a stake in keeping the war plants going. Under such circumstances, any cutback, even any threat of cutback, elicits screams of protest from workers who have jobs at stake, from a wide variety of businesses that have profits at stake, from politicians who have votes at stake.

Such is the colossal, the overwhelming power structure that has been erected around America's new—and permanent—militarism. It is a structure that, as President Eisenhower said, "is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal Government."

—Fred J. Cook, "The Juggernaut," *The Nation*, October 28, 1961

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SPAIN TODAY

BY STEPARIUS

Spain has changed considerably since 1939. In that year the Republic, abandoned by the Western democracies from the beginning of the war, and toward the end abandoned also by Stalin (who had more urgent preoccupations at the frontiers of the USSR), sank under the final offensives of General Franco's troops, aided by technicians, aviation, and "volunteers" from Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.

In 1939, General Franco had on his side: (1) the larger part of the middle class of the country; (2) peasants in the areas of small landholdings—especially those of Castile, Navarra, and Galicia; (3) all the large landowners; (4) the whole of the Roman Catholic Church except for insignificant numbers of regional Basque and Catalanian priests; (5) the whole of the industrial and financial bourgeoisie; and, it is hardly necessary to add, (6) the whole of the aristocracy, the professional military groups, the diplomatic corps, and some professionals who were traditionally class conscious and identified themselves with the upper bourgeoisie and the aristocracy.

The forces defeated in 1939 were: (a) peasants living in the area of latifundia, particularly in Andalucia and Extremadura; (b) the entire industrial proletariat, especially in Vizcaya, the mining zones of the North and of Andalucia, the industries of the East and on the Mediterranean coast; (d) a substantial part, very considerable in quality and quantity, of the intelligentsia—professors, lawyers, historians, writers, university students, the upper echelon of administrative functionaries of the Republic, and leaders of the democratic political parties—a social layer which for the most part went into emigration.

In 1961, the regime personified by General Franco continues to have the active support of the social groups (3), (4), (5) and (6) above. On the other hand, groups (1) and (2)—

Steparius is the pseudonym of a social scientist living in Spain.

middle class and small farmers—have, during the past 20 years, come to adopt a passive attitude, disillusioned or indifferent.

Among the conglomerate forces and social groups which actively or passively support General Franco's regime, we must take special note of the bourgeoisie as the group which has undergone the most significant development and change from 1939 to 1961. When General Franco and his troops won the Civil War, their mentality was formally fascist, that is to say, they imitated fully the language and political organization of the Italian fascism of that period. But at bottom, under this fascist veneer, the mentality of the winners was rather anti-bourgeois, traditionalist, semi-feudal, profoundly rural, anti-rationalist and with semi-mystic aspects. During the period 1939-1961 there have been two fundamental social transformations in Spain: continuous internal migration from rural areas to the few large cities, producing an overgrowth of these urban centers; and a process of industrialization.

In connection with the latter, it should be pointed out that industry in Spain presents two extremes: on the one hand, a high degree of concentration of capital and labor in a few industries with factories employing thousands of workers each—particularly in the mining and manufacturing of iron, steel, and other metals; on the other hand, an extreme atomization of small industries engaged in manufacturing of all kinds. Up to 1960, Spain was "protected" by perhaps the highest tariff barriers in the world. At the same time, during the period between 1939 and 1960, a rash of new industries developed for the purpose of producing, inside Spain, substitutes at any price for the products excluded by these high tariffs. Middle-size industry is very weak compared with the concentrated sector on the one hand and the myriad little industries on the other. Owing to the economic isolation which results from high tariffs, this industrialization process spawned a *petite bourgeoisie* (it is estimated that 200,000 new enterprises were established between 1939 and 1960), and also gave rise to an enormous growth and development of the banking system linked to the monopolies. Naturally, the *petite bourgeoisie*, owners of the means of production in the small-scale industrial sector, as well as the big

capitalists controlling the large industries and the banking system, are enemies of the proletariat and of any social or political change. However, this growth of the bourgeoisie has had its impact on the political superstructure of the country as well as on the dominant class: it has functioned along with the process of urbanization to produce what might be called the de-ruralization of the mentality of both the people and the oligarchy.

In the last twenty years, then, Spain has witnessed a considerable growth of the bourgeoisie and the concentration of the population in large cities. The bourgeoisie, as a social class and as a factor in the economic structure of the country, is today stronger than at any previous period of Spanish history. But due to the spiritual, cultural, and we could almost say anthropological, peculiarities of the Spanish people, these two processes—urbanization and growth of the bourgeoisie—have not produced changes of equal magnitude in other aspects of the social structure of the country.

II

Who has paid for the economic development of Spain during the last twenty years? In good measure, this growth of the city, industry, and bourgeoisie is due to the uninterrupted monetary inflation which lasted until 1959. The international isolation of Spain not only made possible but required those conditions which were instrumental in the country's economic development. And also in good measure, this growth has been paid for by the two great social classes which were defeated in 1939: the proletariat of the industrial centers and the agricultural workers.

If the Spanish bourgeoisie finds itself today able to export many of its manufactured products at prices which are competitive in the international market, or require only slight government subsidies, it is due largely to the low wage level. A worker who is paid 90 pesetas a day (\$1.50; 60 pesetas=\$1.00) is in the category of privileged workers. An industrial worker who earns \$2.00 a day (120 pesetas) is a highly skilled worker. As in all underdeveloped countries, food takes a disproportionately high percentage of the family budget (in Spain it is estimated that 55 to 60 percent of the budget is required for

food), and therefore the possibility of saving any money is practically nil for vast sections of the population. The industrial worker in the cities usually works from 8 to 10 hours a day for six days a week (the legal work-week is 48 hours; beyond this limit overtime rates prevail). He may also have one or more other jobs so that his normal work day is likely to be 12 or 13 hours. Thus putting one salary together with another, he might accumulate a total of 3,500 or 4,000 pesetas a month (\$60 or \$65). Clearly, with this amount he has no more than enough money to pay for food, clothing, transportation, rent, and school for his children. (In Spain schooling is onerously expensive even for only a minimum amount of learning. Free public schools are both few in number and inadequate, providing little more than elementary arithmetic and endless sessions of Catholic religious and political indoctrination). For the rest, the worker may be able to afford a Saturday night movie at which he sees a film mutilated by the puritanical censor. The range of possibilities open to him excludes refrigerator, television, automobile, university studies for his children (only one out of a hundred university students comes from the proletariat), purchase of books, travel abroad. Social classes in Spain are, therefore, hereditary. If in the family of the industrial worker there is more than one employed member, the income is doubled. In this case, the worker has grounds for some hope that in the next generation the family will be able to move up one step in the anemic Spanish social system—the children would then be able to study a trade or profession and thereby move from the proletariat to the middle class. This is a permanent aspiration which is rarely achieved. Among males of the working class in the urban centers, the average marriage age is 29 years—among the highest in the world. This means that by the time the worker is ready to establish his own home he has already given up most of his hopes for personal advancement, has lost faith in the society of which he is a part, and has become sharply conscious of the hard economic realities of that society. At the same time, because he is weighed down by his personal problems, he is unable to develop his class consciousness and an awareness of the condition of his class.

What has been the answer of the proletariat to the ex-

periences of these years? The usual answers in a half-way democratic society, especially strikes for the purpose of winning wage increases, do not exist in Spain. A strike is classified as a crime against the security of the state, and strikers are tried by military tribunal. Of course, within the period 1939-1961 there have been sporadic upsurges of protest and some attempts at general strikes in Barcelona, Bilbao, and a few other cities, with successes only in 1951 and 1957. The Franco regime reacted to these protests with all its apparatus of repression: mass arrests, discharging of strikers, mobilization of the police, beatings, torture of prisoners, etc.

These repressive acts, instead of provoking a general wave of indignation, produced instead a contrary reaction: individuals avoided compromising themselves, refused to accept political involvement, were concerned only with themselves, disengaged themselves from any collective consciousness which might be interpreted as an expression of personal solidarity with the victims. No doubt there have been notable isolated cases of personal sacrifice and dedication to the cause of the proletariat—several hundred admirable examples between 1951 and 1961—but the fate of these individual victims of the Franco police is the more dramatic when contrasted with the indifference of the great mass.

Only a section of the proletariat, the workers in large factories, is aware that it is being exploited by the bourgeoisie. They react in two ways: by slowing down production, and by leaving the country at the first opportunity. In this latter fashion, the industrial worker swells the current of emigrants who, according to economic circumstance, go to Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Germany, and countries of Western Europe. This current of emigrants numbers no less than 50,000 persons a year, and among them are included the most advanced members of the Spanish proletariat—the most skilled, the most politically conscious, and those with the highest cultural level. This continuous emigration explains many things apparently inexplicable in the recent history of Spain: the weakness of the underground anti-Franco organization; the passivity of the proletariat which lacks political cadres (when it does create them, they are soon lost through emigra-

tion or imprisonment). Simultaneously, the exodus of one group of proletarians leaves room for the influx of impoverished peasants from the rural zones which are being rapidly depopulated. Due to Spain's inadequate statistics, it is difficult to know exactly how many people have migrated from the countryside to the cities during the period 1939-1961, but it is probable that the number exceeds five million.

III

Which, then, are the groups and the forces in Spanish society that can be counted on to bring about a social or political change? If the industrial proletariat would become conscious of its exploited status, if it knew the inner workings of the oligarchy and the inter-relations between the banking system, the upper bureaucracy, industry, and the monopolies, no doubt this industrial proletariat—some 3 million workers—would represent a decisive factor in the political evolution of the country. Today, it can be stated that the majority of this proletariat has been alienated: it has been caught in the trap of installment-buying with its concomitant petty bourgeois illusions; it has fallen for the idiocy of simple-minded diversions like football. The feminine section of the working-class is also alienated, with the exception of those admirable women whose husbands and sons are either in prison or have emigrated. These women, through their personal sacrifice, have taken the place of their absent men and carry on the struggle to maintain their families. In some cases, the women are dominated by the Church, but the majority live burdened and oppressed by their daily economic problems. Without doubt, there is first-rate political strength latent in this working class, today alienated to the very roots of its human condition (naturally, an alienation carefully cultivated and reinforced by all the means of communication at the service of the regime: press, radio, pulpit). The problem lies in activating this latent force; and in this task all the underground political groups—including the Marxists—have failed. The drama of the Spanish working class resides in the fact that while it is exploited as is no other proletariat in Europe, and by a smaller oligarchic minority than any other

in Europe, it is entirely unconscious of the intensity of its exploitation.

The situation is completely different in the rural areas of latifundia, particularly in the South and Southeast of the country. Some million peasants live there. For the most part, they are landless and work only when they are called to the large farms owned by the aristocratic landholders. The emigration from these rural zones in the South and Southeast has been continuous during the last 20 years, and there are towns where only women and old men remain. This migration has contributed toward the lessening of social tensions, but there remains in the South a peasant mass with a strong political potential and, naturally, with greater political awareness than the "bourgeoisified" industrial proletariat. All the Andalusian farmers have heard about Fidel Castro and the Agrarian Reform. Many are more than semi-literate, but precisely because they have become aware of their situation and wish to change it, they represent one of the most positive elements for change in Spanish society. Spain, however, has 30,500,000 inhabitants and this agricultural proletariat of the South constitutes a small minority.

Let us turn to another minority which occupies a separate place in the social structure: the intellectuals. At the end of the Civil War, the most valuable intellectuals had already left the country. In the period 1939-1961, an intellectual minority coming from the middle class and the lower middle class has slowly been developing. If, in 1939, the mere word "intellectual" was disparaging and synonymous with Marxist or disturber of the peace, today the same cannot be said, even though the political police still considers many of the intellectuals suspect. The Spanish intellectual minority as it has been reconstituted during the past twenty years, is the smallest of all the minorities. A political awakening based on Marxist theory has taken place with a certain force among the youth in three or four cities and their universities. However, since there are no university publications and those which are born have a limited life due to the deadly impact of the Church censorship, this more-or-less Marxist theoretical consciousness finds outlet in only a few small meetings without any repercussions among the proletariat.

A really effective and active alliance between the university youth and the proletariat has not yet come into being.

In considering this somber panorama, a question arises almost spontaneously: Is it possible for the Franco regime to outlive Franco himself? No. The regime is much too personalized to outlast the death or incapacitation of the dictator. If the most important generals of the Army, the Cardinals, and the great financiers restore the House of Bourbon to the throne (perhaps with the last-minute help of the U.S. State Department to whom the monarchy could offer the guaranty of maintaining military bases in Spain), they will undoubtedly try, under an apparently constitutional and parliamentary monarchy, to continue the present system of distribution of power and control over the economic resources of the country. Only dreamers can imagine that the monarchy might carry out even the most timid agrarian reform. How could it, in view of the fact that the principal large landowners are members of the nobility? Only dreamers, too, can think that the monarchy would punish by law the police who under Franco have been torturers and assassins; that with its restoration there would be freedom of the press to denounce a tax system which redistributes income in favor of the rich, or to disclose to the public the depth of the corruption of the bureaucracy of Madrid, or to expose to the light of day the connections between the seven large national banks and the most important monopolies, to show to the public the economic power of some 400 families, to reveal to the people how the capitalists take their profits out of the country to deposit them in Swiss and other foreign banks, etc., etc. The Franco regime cannot survive him because it has created a series of fictitious institutions cut to the measure of the dictator (such as the pseudo-parliament or Cortes). These institutions will have to be reformed or abolished in favor of new ones when the form of the state itself changes. But, at the same time, the forces of the oligarchy will try to create a different facade of constitutional laws while in reality maintaining the same socio-economic structure.

Given the rigidity of this structure, it is inconceivable that important transfers of political or economic power from one class to another can be achieved by peaceful means. If all

political change of historic significance in the life of a country results from previous changes in the socio-economic structure, and if these changes are important in shifting the concentration of power from one group or class to another, it is evident that in Spain the working class and the peasantry will not be able to assume the necessary power to reform the political superstructure unless they take power into their own hands and out of those of the oligarchy. From this point of view, the question "Can the Franco regime survive?" can be answered in the affirmative. Franco's regime can survive without the fictitious institutions created by him so long as the working class does not attain a collective consciousness and therefore demand the political representation which it lacks today. But there should be no illusions: the oligarchy will not graciously grant this political representation.

We have noted that substantial changes occurred in Spain between 1939 and 1961 and that during this period the bourgeoisie acquired importance. It must now be added that these changes in the Spanish socio-economic structure *have been reflected* in the present regime itself. When Franco rose to power, the landowners were the most important socio-economic group supporting the military rebellion against the Republic. In 1936 or in 1939, Franco's regime was not identified with the monopolistic bourgeoisie for the simple reason that this bourgeoisie did not exist in Spain—it was just being born at that time. Today in Spain, a strong monopolistic bourgeoisie has established financial relations with international monopoly capital—North American, German, etc. Behind the more or less unchanging facade of its political structure, the regime of Franco, during the last twenty years, has nurtured this decisive change in the internal structure of the oligarchy; and this oligarchy—bourgeois and capitalist—does not feel any need to establish democratic political forms. Without any doubt, here lies its present strength. But here also lies the assurance that one day it will disappear, through violence, without any kind of compromise.

THE SHELTERED LIFE

BY ALEXANDER L. CROSBY

For thousands of years the Mississippi River used to overflow its banks and raise hell in the lowlands. So long as the casualties were limited to rabbits, mice, woodchucks, and Indians, there was no great anxiety in Washington. But the federal government gradually took notice when the periodic floods conveyed a growing number of cows, horses, pigs, and white citizens to the Gulf of Mexico, a bourne from which few of the involuntary travelers ever returned.

Something had to be done to check these recurrent inroads upon the constituents of Congressmen from the lower basin. There were two alternatives: first, prevent the floods by building dams upstream, raising levees, straightening the channel, and providing overflow basins; or, second, encourage the inhabitants to build boats for themselves and barges for their cattle and chickens.

There were stout advocates of the ark system. They declared that floods were inevitable—man could never control the great river, and the Lord never intended for him to try. Hence the only course was to keep the maximum number of people and domestic animals above the water level. Anyone who was seriously averse to drowning could knock a boat together out of old packing boxes or hire a shipwright to do it for him.

But the save-your-own-life school lost out in Congress. The Army engineers were instructed to stop the floods. They did. It was one of the more sensible achievements of a government that sometimes forgets the value of common sense.

Now, only a generation later, the government has backslid. Confronted with the prospect of an atomized or irradiated population, Washington acts as if the prevention of war were impossible. The citizens are advised to try to save their own lives by methods that are as dependable as a raft built of screen

Alexander L. Crosby, a former newspaperman, lives by a Pennsylvania pond and writes pamphlets and children's books.

wire and angle irons. This is my conclusion after reading, re-reading, and rereading a 10¢ pamphlet entitled *The Family Fallout Shelter*, published in June 1959 by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

This curious document reached me by accident. It had been left, like a fatherless child, on the doorstep of a friend who is vice president of a large publishing firm. Why was my own doorstep passed by? It is true that I am only a writer and my sole directory listing is in the Quakertown-Perkasie-Sellersville telephone book. But I live far enough from New York and Philadelphia to have 1 chance in 10,000,000 of surviving an elaborate blast, whereas my friend is so close to New York that he would become part of the fallout.

The nasty implication is that, regardless of the facts of death, the government is playing favorites. It has junked the Jeffersonian ideal and dedicated itself to the imaginary survival of the fattest.

My suspicion is strengthened by the delay of 28 months in getting the pamphlet onto the most important doorsteps. The mills of the federal investigators grind slowly. I can visualize an army of punch card operators working for two years to record data on the economic, civic, and political worth of each citizen. I can see the cards being fed into sorting machines that determine which people are worth sheltering. It is probably more than a coincidence that my friend has been active in Democratic politics.

However that may be, the most interesting exhibit in the pamphlet is an outline map of the United States showing 117 areas of fallout one hour after "a large assumed attack on military and civilian targets." No doubt for security reasons, the names of cities and states are omitted. So is the name of the country, but the silhouette is unmistakable. Now I happen to own a map (not classified) full of city and state names. By comparing the two maps, I have been able to identify the areas that are doomed—if the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization has correctly gauged the intentions of The Enemy. (The pamphlet gives no clue to the identity of The Enemy, who is probably Dr. Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd.)

All of the biggest cities are marked for extinction. So are

scores of smaller ones, such as Twin Falls, Bismarck, and McCook, Nebraska. In the East the target areas are so close together that the one-hour fallout areas overlap. The lesson is plain: Whether we build shelters or not, most of us are going to be roasted pigeons. The only areas beyond the reach of blast and fire storm are those wastelands to which we foolishly removed the Indians. If you are lucky enough to live on a reservation, you have reason to build a fallout shelter. Someday the country will be yours again, although not in very good condition.

There is a slim chance that fallout shelters might prove useful off the reservations. Suppose that The Enemy decided it would be impolitic to eliminate much more than the national administration, General Motors, and the Pennsylvania Railroad. He would remember that the United States gained few friends around the world by irradiating Japan. And so he might use nothing worse than a few one-megaton warheads.

In that event, *The Family Fallout Shelter* could save millions and millions of us. But I don't think this edition will do the trick. The authors are clearly the products of sheltered lives. They recommend a do-it-yourself job of concrete blocks costing only \$200, which can be erected in the cellar. But millions of families live in shacks or standard houses that don't have cellars. What then? Well, they can build a shelter above ground. This will run to \$700 for materials and the contractor's price will probably double the cost. As a rough guess, a family should have an income of about \$6,000 and thrifty habits to afford a \$1,400 outlay. Sixty percent of the families in the United States are below the \$6,000 level. Many of those who could afford shelters live in cities where there is no place to build.

But let us try to be cheerful. We shall turn to the well-heeled suburbanite who is tired of mowing the grass plot in the backyard. He has two lovely children he wants to grow up, a moderately attractive wife, and a peach of a secretary. So he studies the five diagrams for different kinds of shelters. All of them provide space for two weeks' occupancy by exactly six persons.

Why the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization hit upon six as the family norm is something the pamphlet doesn't tell. This figure offers boundless possibilities for mischief. Who will

the other two persons be? The wife's mother, the husband's mother or, heaven forbid, both of them? Or will there be a deal: "I'll include your mother if you'll include my secretary?"

If the wife dearly loves her mother, there is a chance that Miss Mayapple may also be sheltered. The underground life with her boss will be cozy, to say the least. The average adult requires 15 square feet of sleeping space. Four adults would need practically the entire floor, thereby posing the alternatives of some overlapping or else forcing the children to stand during the night. Either way there would be problems.

The pamphlet simply avoids the question of pet dogs, cats, rabbits, mice, turtles, and snakes. Presumably they would be fitted into the interstices.

Concrete is the recommended building material. "There is about the same amount of shielding in 8 inches of concrete, for instance, as in 12 inches of earth, 16 inches of books, or 30 inches of wood," the pamphlet says. "In most of the country, these thicknesses would give ample protection for a basement shelter."

Although the authors were too cautious to go further in their reference to books, here is a thought for the poor to develop. Concrete blocks cost about 25¢ each, but wherever there is a public library, books are free. Maybe everybody can afford a shelter after all.

To sum up, we believe that although the present civil defense program, and in particular the construction of fallout shelters, might save a small fraction of the population in a nuclear war, this potential gain is more than offset by the fact that such activity prepares the people for the acceptance of thermonuclear war as an instrument of national policy. We believe that this acceptance would substantially increase the likelihood of war—a war which would be permanently fatal to our democratic society, even if not to all of us. The American people are capable of great effort and sacrifice. We believe this effort should be directed toward a positive program for peace with freedom. This is bound to be at least as difficult and time consuming as any preparation for war, and will require the highest type of leadership for success. At the present time the nation is not ready to consider such a program, largely because of widespread lack of understanding of just how catastrophic war today would be. We call upon you, Mr. President, to make this plain and then to lead the nation forward on a race towards peace.

—*An Open Letter to President Kennedy,*
183 Professors, November 10, 1961

ON THE PRICE OF MR PRESS BOOKS

We recently received a letter from a California reader dealing with the publishing policies of MR Press. Since the questions asked have doubtless occurred to other readers, we are publishing both the letter and our reply.—The Editors

Letter to the Editors

I am writing this as a letter of protest against your book-publishing policies: the prices you charge for your hardcover editions, and the lack of duplication of some of these in low-priced paperback editions.

I am especially irritated by the outrageous price you have put upon J. P. Morray's *From Yalta to Disarmament*.

Even if it were a 1,000-page book, it still should not cost \$8.50. For something as tiny as 384 pages, it is completely ridiculous.

Apparently this is a very important book, yet I can't read it because I can't afford to buy it.

Are you ever going to put it out in a paperback edition?

If so, when—10 or 20 years from now?

If not, why not? (What is this "high initial cost" nonsense?)

How in hell do you expect working-class people to be able to afford your hardcover books?

Why don't you concentrate exclusively on paperback books, or else publish paperback editions of all your hardcover books?

I don't care what your prepublication prices are; they are still about twice as much as corresponding paperback prices; and most people will have to buy *after* publication.

Even if I could spare \$8.50 for Morray's book, I probably would not buy it, as a matter of principle.

Are you interested in spreading knowledge, or are you interested mainly in making capitalistic superprofits?

From a buck-hungry capitalist publisher, I expect high prices; from Monthly Review Press, I do not.

I would appreciate some sort of answer to this letter.

Reply by the Editors

The key to the answer to your protest is contained in your

argument, "From a buck-hungry capitalist publisher, I expect high prices; from Monthly Review Press, I do not."

The fact is it should be the other way around. Precisely because MR Press is a socialist house you should expect its prices to be higher, not lower, than those of a capitalist publishing house.

Why? Because MR Press books are radical, therefore they are not reviewed in the *New York Times* and other journals which are important for the general sale of books; because MR Press, having very little capital, cannot afford the extremely high cost of advertising its books in the commercial press. Since our books are neither reviewed nor widely advertised, most bookstores won't stock our books, and we don't have the money to pay the salaries of salesmen to put pressure on them to do so.

The result is that the press run for most of our books is considerably lower than the ordinary press run of the average book of a capitalist house. And there's the rub. *The cost of book production is, in large measure, determined by the number of books printed.* The economies of large-scale production apply to books as to everything else, only more so.

Here is a concrete example: It cost us \$3039.32 for composition, author's alterations, and extra sets of galley proofs for the *Yalta* book. We printed 4000 copies of that book so composition alone (not counting paper, presswork, editing, binding, jackets, overhead, advertising, promotion) came to 75.9c per book. If we had printed 8000 copies of the book, the composition cost would have been exactly half, or 37.9c per book. With the higher press run, the cost of most of the other items that enter into the making of a book would have been cut similarly—and the list price could have been lower accordingly.

The size of the press run is the determining factor in the production of paperbacks, too. *If* we got reviewed, *if* we had a big advertising budget, *if* we had a distribution system that got our books into paperback stores and drugstores, in short, *if* our press run could be measured in the hundreds of thousands instead of in the few thousands, then we could print more of our books in cheap paperbacks. But that is not the case. In the small editions we print, cheap paperbacks are impossible.

Here is another example: Our book, *Cuba: Anatomy of*

a *Revolution*, was put out as a paperback at \$1.75. The difference in cost to us between our cloth edition of the book and the paperback was exactly 15c! Shortly after our book appeared, Ballantine Books published C. Wright Mills' book, *Listen Yankee*, at 50c per copy. Ballantine's initial press run was 250,000 copies—that's the secret of the low price. We don't have the exact figures, but our guess is that the *whole book* cost Ballantine something like 8c to make, whereas our Cuba paper binding cost 11c alone!

Generally speaking, we can do paperbacks only after we have sold the cloth book successfully; then we can take leftover sheets and put a paperback binding on them. That's what we have done with *American Radicals*, *Alienation of Modern Man*, *American Labor in Midpassage*, *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*, and *Man's Worldly Goods*. Our paperback prices compare favorably with serious paperbacks of other publishers.

We are aware of the fact that the list price of our cloth-bound books is beyond the reach of the working man like yourself (though they are not out of line with book prices today). That's why we have a long period of prepublication prices when the books are offered at real bargain prices. Again, the very book you are interested in is the best example. We offered the *Yalta* book at the extremely low prepublication price of \$3.50—that's when you should have bought the book. You are quite wrong in saying, "I don't care what your prepublication prices are." You should care. Particularly if you want to buy books at a low price. (Right now, until December 31, you can buy *Yalta* at \$5—a saving of \$3.50 and a very good buy.) Don't wait for *Yalta* to appear as a paperback, we can't possibly afford it, ever.

One final word: We *are* interested in spreading knowledge—and *we are also interested in making profits*. We have to be. How else could we finance the publication of other books? The all too small profits of MR Press enable us to publish a list of books of which we are justly proud, and they help pay the losses we incur on MONTHLY REVIEW. That seems to us a better plan than going broke—in which case we could not publish anything at any price.

WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

Seed Bed of Revolution

Washington's crusade for peace and progress under the leadership of the Kennedy administration has run into rough weather—in Asia, Europe, and Latin America. Names and numbers differ along the battle front, but the situation everywhere has the same general outlines.

All through 1961 Latin America has been in the news. In April it was Cuba. In August it was British Guiana. In October trouble boiled up again in South America. Here is the *U.S. News & World Report* summary (issue of November 6): "Anti-government upheavals rocked Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador in late October. In La Paz, Bolivia, at least eight persons were killed, scores injured in rioting touched off by gasoline-tax increases." Lima, Peru, reported a riot in which a student was killed in front of the National Capitol. "In Quito, Ecuador, the leftist Confederation of Workers called a nation-wide sit-down strike that . . . cost at least four lives."

These expressions of unrest and protest came after Washington's offer to buy \$20-billion worth of peace, prosperity, and progress for Latin America. What is the matter with Latin America? The answer is the same as that which comes from Asia and Africa: hunger, disease, enforced idleness, coercion, exploitation.

With unimportant exceptions, the physical conditions surrounding the lives of well-to-do Latin Americans are quite comparable with those of business and professional people in North America and Western Europe. Latin American workers face a wholly different situation. Much of the working class housing in the countryside is primitive and inadequate. Families live in frame shacks, often mud-floored, with palm thatch for roof. Latin American farmers and workers are inadequately fed. School facilities are insufficient and often lacking. Illiteracy in Latin America among the country people runs as high as 80 percent. The crowning indignity of Latin American life is

unemployment. The good land is largely monopolized by individual or corporate landlords. Men and women work for the landowners during the crop season. In the off season, these field hands or peons have no work. Some of them migrate from one district to another, following the sugar, coffee, cocoa, rice, tobacco, and fruit crops. Some drift to the cities and do odd jobs.

This seasonal drift of landless, workless, rootless, field hands into glutted city labor markets is one of the most demoralizing features of the Latin American economy. If the workless field hand remains in the countryside, he and his family starve in the off season. If he moves to the city where the chances are ten to one against his finding a steady job, again he and his family starve. Wherever he goes and whatever he does, poverty, hunger, and disease dog his steps.

More than four centuries have passed since Europeans began seizing the land and exploiting the labor of Latin Americans. This "civilizing" process has developed a situation in which the owning, ruling minority dominates the lives of the working majority, denying them any real opportunity to change their lot unless they are able to acquire sufficient wealth to help the minority carry out its you-work-we-eat policy.

There are three ways in which the Latin American masses seek to escape the hardships and injustices which Western civilization has imposed upon them. This first is migration. The second is banditry. The third is revolution.

It Shouldn't Happen There

Ray Vicker was in Prague, presumably to dig up some dirt beyond the Iron Curtain. Instead of dirt he found surprises which he reported in an article headed "Red 'Prosperity.'" (*Wall Street Journal*, October 9, 1961).

Surprise Number One: Every fifth adult in Czechoslovakia belongs to the Communist Party which is "the highest percentage of party membership for any country in the world."

Surprise Number Two: "The standard of living in Czechoslovakia is higher than anywhere else behind the Iron Curtain," but "as a citizen gets better off materially, he doesn't necessarily lose interest in Communism." "The better off people become in the Communist world, the redder they get." "Not only is the

Communist Party very strong here, but the Red Czech regime acts as if it possessed fervent revolutionary zeal."

Surprise Number Three: "Agriculture is being socialized to a greater degree than even the Soviets have dared attempt. And whereas anti-Red grumblings are often heard in Poland and Hungary, the Czechs seem . . . better adjusted to Communist rule."

Surprise Number Four: Czechoslovakian per capita output of steel is higher than Britain's and almost up to America's. In 1960, 132,000 refrigerators and 194,000 vacuum cleaners left the assembly lines. In a country of 14 million people, a million television sets are in use. With one half of one percent of the world's population, the country produces 2 percent of the world's industrial output.

Surprise Number Five: "At the six-story White Swan Department Store in downtown Prague, floors are as crowded as Macy's just before Christmas. Everything from needles to complete kitchens are on display. . . . Especially noticeable are such consumer goods as fly-fishing rods, spinning reels, skin diving suits, rubber boats, and other products usually associated with an affluent society."

Surprise Number Six: "Cheap staple foods are coupled with low rent that seldom amounts to more than 5 percent of incomes, and with free medical care. Here again red propaganda constantly stresses that 'socialism' is responsible for these gains, with the implication that the alternative is a system of high rents, expensive food, and stiff medical bills."

Surprise Number Seven: "The government proclaims that all this is being made possible through Communism. Many young people now don't even remember any other system, so they seem willing to believe the propaganda. 'We find it difficult now to talk to our children in certain areas,' one parent says, rather sadly. 'They don't know what we mean when we use such words as *landlords* or *profit-motives* or *free speech*. So we must explain to them, and even then they don't seem to understand.'"

If socialism is really being built in Czechoslovakia, a *Wall Street Journal* writer who risks a trip beyond the Iron Curtain must expect to be surprised in more ways than seven.

The Road Ahead

Humanity is closing its books on an old year of unrest, anxiety, tension, and conflict. It is entering a new year, 1962, with every prospect of similar pressures, stepped up to meet the climactic crisis which lies immediately ahead.

Nature's first premise is survival. Her second premise is change—change of every conceivable kind, in every conceivable dimension of her vast domain. This universal pressure to change will animate and dominate the whole of 1962 as it has animated and dominated previous years, centuries, millennia.

There are changes over which humankind exercises little or no direct control—changes in the solar system, chemical and physical changes in the planet, changes in weather, changes in the cycle of birth, maturity, death. Knowledge and mastery in these fields are growing and will grow more rapidly in the future, but immense and little-known aspects of nature and of society remain to be explored, understood, and utilized in mankind's rapid advance from local apprenticeship through planetary mastery to penetration of the immensities that lie beyond earth's atmosphere.

Through ages mankind has enlarged control over the environment at a snail's pace. Recently changes have been speeded almost fabulously. The rate of change will be even more rapid in the immediate future. Man has made himself at home on the earth, on and under the water, and in the air. In the near future he will be equally at home in distant space.

A quadruped-turned-biped, man has mastered materials, other living creatures, wind, water, fire. Presently he is learning to use mechanical energy. Already, in electricity, man has a powerful, adaptable, tireless servitor. Gradually he is learning to control the more potent energies of mind. Controlling these forces, humanity has turned from its dependence upon status to a science of change, using forethought, experiment, discovery, invention as the means of achieving desired results.

Deliberative change involves the establishment of social goals or objectives and the planned projects necessary to reach the goals, together with a timetable of priorities and the administrative apparatus necessary to fulfill the plans. Such a program presupposes the advantage of change and specifies the

steps in an orderly procedure from the existing social institutions and practices to those which social scientists and engineers envision.

Our forebears changed the form of government from colonial status under an hereditary monarchy to a republic, first with a limited franchise, then through the years extended voting rights to all adult citizens. Meanwhile, the economy remained non-governmental or private. Extreme *laissez faire* has been replaced by increasing degrees of governmental regulation, but ownership and much of economic control remains in private hands.

Elsewhere on the planet the idea of people's government has been coupled with the idea of people's economy as the private economic sector has been drastically narrowed, and the public sector broadened. Half a century ago, the public ownership and control of the economy upon which public livelihood and well-being depended was still a theory, supported and attacked by its advocates and its opponents. Today more than a billion human beings live in countries which are dedicated to restricting the private sector and enlarging the public sector of their economies.

The first Soviet social and economic plans were made forty years ago. Through the ensuing decades they have resulted in the conversion of an obsolete and disorganized social pattern into a systematic effort by two hundred million people to build an economy, a state, and a society along lines that correspond with the possibilities of a science-conscious, rationally-directed society.

Planned change modernized Tsarist Russia in less than one generation. Similar procedures put the obsolete social pattern of imperial China on the way to orderly improvement in less than a decade. In Cuba the process was well advanced at the end of two years. British Guiana, utilizing its new-won independence, and taking advantage of foreign experience, should be on the highroad to a better life for more people within the year.

Each step along the beaten path of social conformity is dogged by changes which may be for the better or for the worse. Each step off the path beaten by tradition and custom may

lead to notable betterment. If misconceived or fumbled, it may land the bold initiator in the ditch.

The first half of the 20th century has proved that the new wine of harnessed natural energies and automatically produced abundance cannot be contained in the old bottles of grab-and-keep society. At this point in his advance from human muscle to the boundless cosmic energy of sun and other stars, mankind must move forward, aware of the possibilities for abundance, stored knowledge, and boundless opportunity, and equally aware of the obstacles already surmounted and the perils that beset the road ahead. One false step into nuclear war may undo the patient work of centuries, decimate humanity, and hurl the human family back to the position which it occupied three thousand years ago when western civilization was in its initial stages.

Each step in advance has increased productivity, broadened horizons, offered more and more people the chance to initiate and build. At the same time that it raises the potential of production, by an even greater margin has it increased the power of destruction. Equipped with the latest devices, war-makers may bring about destruction which is total and final. Nuclear war is the most tangible and formidable danger that mankind will face in the years immediately ahead.

The stream of human achievement based on man's reason, imagination, ingenuity, initiative, and daring reaches back to pre-history. In early times it was a trickle in nature's wilderness. Then it became a stream that waxed and waned through successive experiences with building up and tearing down empires. Latterly the stream has broadened to a river with the modern revolution in production, transport, and communication. In the first sixty years of the present century the spread of knowledge and the awakening of peoples to life's possibilities have converted the river of modern culture into a raging torrent that is sweeping the entire human family into a wide ocean of possibilities and opportunities that lie open before mankind.

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(continued from inside front cover)

Counted. For further information on how to do these things, write Fellowship of Reconciliation, Box 271, Nyack, N. Y.

A group of Cornell faculty members concerned, like their colleagues at the universities mentioned above, with the threat of world war, have announced their intention to suspend their normal activities on November 17 and "devote class time to a discussion of global war and nuclear testing." Teachers in other colleges please note this as another answer to the persistent question "What Can I Do?"

Thanks again to those of you who have been sending in gift subscriptions. If you haven't, please turn now to pages 360-361 and reflect on the 5 ways of helping MR—and yourself, and your friends.

Readers in the New York area: don't forget that the season's first meeting of MR Associates will be held on Tuesday evening, December 5, with Professor Paul Baran as speaker, and Paul Sweezy as chairman. For details see box below.

The letter of the month is from South Africa:

"I'd like to express my admiration for your initiative, and my great pleasure to notice that also something better than the official hysterical propaganda of the mass circulation magazines, can come from America. The few issues I have read so far have done more to restore some admiration for America than the billions the American Information Service overseas are so recklessly spending on our "education." And this is also the opinion of most of my friends to whom I have showed Monthly Review. There is also another America, it seems."

Correction: A typographical error of considerable importance occurred in our October issue, in the footnote on page 248: the figure of 15 billion should have been 1.5 billion. We apologize for not having caught the mistake in page proof and thank the reader who brought it to our attention.

Our pamphlet, *Socialism Is The Only Answer*, reprinted "by popular demand" as the ad writers say, is now off the press. It is a simple exposition of the case for Socialism, an ABC guide for people new to the movement. It sells for 35¢ a copy, 3 for \$1, and 20 for \$5.

Season's greetings to all.

MONTHLY REVIEW ASSOCIATES

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"The Truth About Cuba"—Leo Huberman
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5

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